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C.2d
in a divorce
it always
terminated on death or
( Civ.
§ 139.) Thus,
there was no necessity for the 1951 amendment unless it applied to support
in integrated agreements.
In my opinion,
the obligation in the present case
did not terminate on death or
for the parties
"otherwise
they did not
mention death or
or any other
but by
providing that the
should continue until the "first
day of July, 1956"
that the payments were not to
terminate for any reason before that date. By specifying that
date, they necessarily precluded any other.
I would affirm the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred.
The petition of plaintiff and appellant for a rehearing and
application to augment the record were denied October 17,
1957. Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted..

[S. F. No. 19375.

In Bank.

Sept. 17, 1957.]

FLORENCE E. CARNEY, as Administratrix, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ANNA SIMMONDS et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] New Trial-Necessity for Issues of Fact: Grounds.-A new
trial may be granted on the "issues" on the grounds, among
others, of errors in law occurring at the trial, that the verdict
or decision is against the law, and irregularity in the proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.)
[2] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-Code Civ. Proc., §§ 590
(stating how issues of fact may be raised), 656 (defining new
trial), must be read and construed in conjunction with the
basic section on motions for new trial, namely, Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 657, which provides that "any" decision may be vacated or
modified on motion for new trial, thereby indicating that the
[2] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 9; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 20.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] New Trial, §§ 9, 19; [2, 4-7] New
Trial, § 9; [8] Decedents' Estates, § 1078; [9] Decedents' Estates,
§ 1077; [10] Judgments,§ 251(5); [11] Pleading,§ 58; [12] Pleading, § 243; [13] Pleading, § 111.
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decision need not
be based on a question of fact,
and which also
the new trial may be on
"all" or
of the issues," further pointing to no distinction
between
and law (the issues).
[3] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact: Grounds.-The grounds for
a new trial motion may be either issues of fact, such as insuffiof the
or issues of
such as
in
proceedings of the court,
conduct of the jury," that the
is "against the law,"
"error in law occurring at the trial'' and others (Code Civ.
§ 657); these grounds clearly indicate that issues of
law may be reexamined on a motion for new trial.
!d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-There may be a "trial"
and hence a situation proper for a new trial motion where only
issues of law are determined.
[5] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-As a matter of orderly
procedure, there is no less reason why the trial court should
have a second chance to reexamine its judgment where issues
of fact are involved than where issues of law or law and fact
are decided.
[6] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-A motion for new trial is
proper procedure in any of the following classes of judgment:
judgment of dismissal after demurrer sustained (disapproving
Jones v. Chalfant, 128 Cal. 334 [60 P. 852]; Oonfar v. Whelan,
8 Cal.App.2d 101 [46 P.2d 991]; Richardson v. United etc. of
Carpenters &: Joiners, 129 Cal.App.2d 249 [276 P.2d 636];
Holmes v. Justice's Court, 19 Cal.App.2d 362, 366 [65 P.2d
820]) ; judgment of dismissal generally (disapproving City of
Pasadena v. Su,perior Court, 212 Cal. 309 [298 P. 968));
judgment on the pleadings (disapproving Abbey Land etc. Go.
v. County of San Mateo, 167 Cal. 434 [139 P. 1068]; Hotel
Park Oentml, Inc. v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 15 Cal.App.2d
293 [59 P.2d 606]; Budrow v. Wheatcraft, 115 Cal.App.2d 517
[252 P.2d 637]); and judgment on agreed statement of ultimate facts (disapproving Gregory v. Gregory, 102 Cal. 50 [36
P. 364] ; City of Pasadena v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309, 314
[298 P. 968]; Kaye v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 269 [164
P. 912]; Quist v. Sandman, 154 Cal. 748 [99 P. 204]; Monteverde v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.App. 252 [212 P. 690); Pahlka
v. McOormiclc, 123 Cal.App.2d 763 [267 P.2d 390]; Gillmore
v. American Central Ins. Go., 65 Cal. 63 [2 P. 882]); but possibly not in the case of default judgments or judgments by
agreement or confession where there may be the question of
the right of the moving party to make any objection to the
judgment.
[7a, 7b] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-There is no difference
between a judgment on the pleadings and one after the sus-
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taining of a
demurrer; both are judgments on the
pleadings and may be vacated or set aside on motion for new
trial.
[8] Decedents' Estates-Equitable Relief From Decree-Pleading.
-In an action by decedent's mother for equitable relief from
a decree assigning the entire estate to the surviving widow,
the complaint stated a cause of action where it alleged either
directly or by inference that plaintiff had no knowledge of the
application for setting aside the estate and was not given
notice thereof although she knew the probate proceedings were
pending, that the administratrix was fraudulent in representing to the court that she had given special notice and in her
failure to give notice for the purpose of enhancing the amount
that would be received from the estate by defendant widow,
that to carry out that fraud she misrepresented the value of
the estate to the court, that as a result plaintiff did not contest
the proceedings and, since the estate exceeded $2,500, that the
result would have been different but for the fraud.
[9] !d.-Equitable Relief From Decree-Fraud.-Equity may afford relief from orders and decrees in probate proceedings
for extrinsic fraud.
[10] Judgments-Equitable Relief-Fraud.-A judgment may be
attacked in equity on the ground of extrinsic fraud where it
appears that there was a willful failure to give the required
notice or that willfully false affidavits of service were filed.
[11] Pleading-Complaint-Effect of Prayer.-The prayer of a

complaint does not destroy an otherwise sufficiently stated
cause of action.
[12] !d.-Motion for Judgment on Pleadings.-Where facts stated
in the pleadings indicate that plaintiff may have a good cause
of action but that it has been defectively or imperfectly
pleaded, but defendants do not call attention to such defects
either by demurrer or by duly noticed motion for judgment on
the pleadings, although they have long known the condition
of the pleadings preceding trial, the court should not grant
their surprise motion for judgment on the pleadings, which
attacked the pleadings for the first time at the time of trial,
without first giving plaintiff an opportunity to elect whether
she would stand on the pleadings or amend them; and defendants' failure to give plaintiff notice of intention to attack
the pleadings prior to trial excuses plaintiff's failure to go to
trial armed with formal amendments to offer.
[13] Id.-Amendment.-Plaintiff was justified in assuming that
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 861; Am.

Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 490.
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a formal motion to amend her complaint would have been
futile where the trial court adopted defendants' view that the
pleadings could not be amended to state a cause of action.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County and from an order granting a new trial and
vacating the judgment. Leonard R. Avilla, Judge. Appeal
from judgment dismissed; order affirmed.
Action for equitable relief from judgment assigning entire
estate to surviving widow. Appeal from judgment on pleadings against plaintiff dismissed; order granting plaintiff's motion for new trial, affirmed.
Eugene S. Clifford and Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jacobsen & Tobin and Harold W. Tobin for Defendants
and Appellants.
CARTER, J.-In this case plaintiff commenced an action
which she entitled one for the partition of real property
against defendants. Defendants' demurrer was overruled
and plaintiff filed an amended complaint. No demurrer was
filed to the amended complaint; it was answered, defendants
claiming among other things that it did not state a cause
of action. When it came on for trial defendants moved for
a "judgment on the pleadings" on the ground that the
amended complaint failed to state a cause of action in that it
purported to attack a decree assigning the entire estate to
a widow on the ground of extrinsic fraud but failed to allege
such fraud or show that a different result would have been
reached but for the fraud. It was argued and then the court
stated that if plaintiff was able to prove what she alleged, she
had a cause of action but "this" is not it; the defendants'
motion for "judgment on the pleadings is granted." Then
followed a discussion about amending the amended complaint
and the court said it granted the motion without leave to
amend. The court made and filed an order for ''judgment on
the pleadings" without leave to amend and for defendants.
It also entered a judgment on that order. Plaintiff gave
notice of motion ''for a new trial and for order vacating
and setting aside judgment" on the pleadings and for an
order allowing her to file a proposed amended complaint. The
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court made its
motion
for a new trial, vacated the
and gave plaintiff
leave to amend. Defendants appeal from the order granting
a new trial and vacating the judgment; plaintiff cross-appeal£
from the judgment. Treating the motion and order as one for
new trial, it must be considered as a proper procedure for
the reasons hereinafter stated.
The statutes on new trial
that: 'A new trial is a
re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court after a
trial and decision by a jury, court or referee." (Code Civ.
Proc., § 656.) ''An issue of law arises upon a demurrer to
the complaint or answer, or to some part thereof." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 589.) "An issue of fact arises-'' 1. Upon a material allegation in the complaint controverted by the answer ; and,
"2. Upon new matters in the answer, except an issue of
law is joined thereon." (Code Civ. Proc., § 590.) [1] A new
trial may be granted on the ''issues'' on the grounds, among
others, errors in law occurring at the trial, that the verdict
or decision is against the law and irregularity in the proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.)
It has been held, in a first group of cases, that pursuant
to sections 590 and 656, as to various classes of judgments,
a motion for a new trial was not the proper procedure; that
the trial court should not grant a motion for a new
trial: (1) Judgment of dismissal after demurrer sustained:
Jones v. Chalfant, 128 Cal. 334 [60 P. 852] ; Confar v.
Whelan, 8 Cal.App.2d 101 [46 P.2d 991]; Richardson v.
United etc. of Carpenters & Joiners, 129 Cal.App.2d 249 [276
P.2d 636] ; Holmes v. Justice's Court, 19 Cal.App.2d 362,
366 [65 P.2d 820]. (2) Judgment of dismissal generally:
City of Pasadena v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309 [298 P.
968]. (3) Judgment on the pleadings: Abbey Land etc. Co.
v. County of San Mateo, 167 Cal. 434 [139 P. 1068, Ann.Cas.
1915C 804, 52 L.R.A.N.S. 408], Hotel Park Central, Inc. v.
Security-First Nat. Bank, 15 Cal.App.2d 293 [59 P.2d
606]; Budrow v. Wheatcraft, 115 Cal.App.2d 517 [252 P.2d
637]. (4) Judgment on agreed statement of ultimate facts:
Gregory v. Gregory, 102 Cal. 50 [36 P. 364] ; City of Pasadena v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309, 314 [298 P. 968] ; Kaye
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 269 [164 P. 912] ; Quist v.
Sandman, 154 Cal. 748 [99 P. 204]; Monteverde v. Superior
Court, 60 Cal.App. 252 [212 P. 690] ; Pahlka v. McCormick,
123 Cal.App.2d 763 [267 P.2d 390] ; Gillmore v. American
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Central Ins.

Default judg241 [96 P. 505] ;
nvtc'IJP.S.
P.2d 937]; Crackel v.
; Rehfuss v. Rehfuss,
v. Waldecker, 178 Cal.
P.
65
Cal. 33
66 Cal.
P. 549] ; Estate
149 Cal. 487 [87 P.
; Connell v. McGahie, 37 Cal.
P.
; Hall v.
42 Cal.2d 435, 439
P.2d 249]. It has been said generally that a motion for
a new trial is not proper where no issue of fact is tried.
(Holmes v. Justice's Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.2d 362, 366
P.2d 820] ; Jones v. Chalfant, supra, 128 Cal. 334; Reeves
v. Reeves, supra, 34 Cal.2d 355; Rinaldo v. Superior Court,
15 Cal.App.2d 585 [59 P.2d 868]; Foley v. Foley, supra, 120
Cal. 33; Hotel Park Central, Inc. v. Security-First Nat. Bank,
supra, 15 Cal.App.2d 293; Pahlka v. McCormick, supra, 123
Cal.App.2d 763; Clark v. Torchiana, 19 Cal.App. 786, 790
[127 P. 831]; Hall v. Hall, supra, 42 Ca1.2d 435; Stockton
Iron Works v. Walters, 18 Cal.App. 373 [123 P. 240]; Estate
Richards, 139 Cal. 72 [72 P. 633].)
On the contrary, in a second group of cases, it has been
held that a motion for a new trial is proper in the following
situations: ,Judgment on the pleadings (class 3 of group 1
above) (see Allen v. California Mut. B. & L. Assn., 40 Cal.
App.2d 374 [104 P.2d 851]; Moore v. Bates, 46 Cal. 29) or in
effect the same kind of judgment, the sustaining of an objection to the introduction of any evidence for one reason or
another including the failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action followed by judgment for defendant. (Moore v.
Bates, supra, 46 Cal. 29; Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379
[80 P. 234]; Stow v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. 140 [172 P.
598] ; Allen v. California Mt~t. B. & L. Assn., supra, 40 Cal.
App.2d 374; Bice v. Stevens, 129 Cal.App.2d 342 [277 P.2d
106] .) Judgment of nonsuit either on plaintiff's opening
statement or after his evidence is presented (Carton Corporation v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App. 434, 436 [244 P. 932];
Castillo v. Warren, 44 Cal.App.2d 903 [113 P.2d 232]; Converse v. Scott, 137 Cal. 239 [70 P. 13] ; Toulouse v. Pare, 103
Cal. 251 r37 P. 146]; Bmley v. Empire Water Co., 130 Cal.
App. 532 [20 P.2d 75] ). Judgment on a directed verdict
v. Werner, 28 Cal.App.2d 554 [83 P.2d 56]). And
a motion for a new trial has been indicated as proper alments: McRae v.

P.
8
34 Ca1.2d 355 [209
600
P.
; Waldecker
120

90
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though the issue tried was not one of fact. (See Horstman
v. Krumgold, 55 Cal.App.2d 296 [130 P.2d 721] ; City of Pasadena v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309 [298 P. 968] ; Bice v.
Stevens, supra, 129 Cal.App.2d 342.)
To clarify the law we deem it necessary to re-examine the
law on this subject. The basic reason underlying the decisions
in the five classes of judgments in the first group above mentioned holding a new trial not proper appears to be that a
motion for a new trial should not be entertained where the
only issue tried is one of law as distinguished from one of
fact or one of law and fact. [2] This reason might seem
justified on the basis of sections 656 and 590 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, quoted supra, but those sections must be
read and construed in conjunction with the basic section on
motions for a new trial, section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It provides that "any" decision may be vacated or
modified on motion for a new trial, indicating that the decision
need not necessarily be based on a question of fact. The new
trial may be on ''all'' or ''part of the issues'' further pointing to no distinction between fact and law (the issues).
[3] The grounds for the new trial motion may be either
issues of fact such as insufficiency of the evidence or issues
of law such as "irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party," "misconduct of the jury," that the
decision is "against the law," "error in law occurring at the
trial,'' and others. These grounds clearly indicate that issues
of law may be reexamined on a motion for a new trial.
[4] Moreover it should be observed that there may be a
"trial" and hence a situation proper for a new trial motion
where only issues of law are determined. (See Berri v.
Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 856 [279 P.2d 8] .) [5] As a
matter of orderly procedure there is no less reason why the
trial court should have a second chance to reexamine its
judgment where issues of fact are involved than where issues
of law or law and fact are decided. [6] We conclude therefore that a motion for a new trial is proper procedure in any
of the classes of judgments mentioned in the first group of
cases above cited whether the judgment is based on law or
fact or both, except possibly in the case of default judgments
or judgments by agreement or confession where there may
be the question of the right of the moving party to make any
objection to the judgment. The cases cited in support of the
judgments in classes 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the first group of cases
are disapproved as well as the statements in those cases
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which limit a new trial to a case where there has been an
issue of fact tried ; the results reached in the second group of
cases are approved. There are suggestions in some of the cases
that where judgment is entered after a demurrer is sustained
a new trial should not be proper, but there appears to be no
difference between that situation and the others in the first
four classes of judgment in the first group of cases above cited.
The issue determined in all is one of law. [7a] For illustration, there is no difference between a judgment on the
pleadings and one after the sustaining of a demurrer; they
are both judgments on the pleadings. (Dragna v. White, 45
Cal.2d 469 [289 P.2d 428] ; Beverage v. Canton Placer Mining
Co., 43 Cal.2d 769 [278 P.2d 694].) We hold, therefore, that
a motion for a new trial was proper in the case at bar. It
must be determined therefore whether the new trial was
properly granted under the circumstances here presented.
Plaintiff1 alleges in her amended complaint that she is the
mother of Thomas Simmonds, deceased, who died intestate, and
owner as tenant in common of a half interest in described real
property; that defendants are McMinn, the administrator of
Thomas' estate, and his widow, and they claim an interest in
the property; that the property was the separate property of
Thomas and there being no issue of his marriage, plaintiff and
his widow each inherited a half interest under section 223
of the Probate Code; that on October 2, 1951, plaintiff served
a request for special notice of estate proceedings on the attorneys for McMinn ;2 that "Plaintiff is informed and believes
and therefore alleges that said ... McMinn on or about the
15th day of October, 1951, fraudulently procured a decree purportedly assigning the whole estate of Thomas ... deceased, to
the surviving widow, 3 the defendant 4 • • • ; that in order to
obtain said decree said defendant ... McMinn fraudulently
and with intent to deceive said Court and to obtain a greater
interest in the real property . . . represented to the Court

"'f
1

Her administrator was substituted in her place since she died.
an heir requests special notice of estate proceedings, notice shall
be given to him by mail or personally served. (Prob. Code, §§ 1202,
1200.)
'If decedent leaves a surviving spouse and the net value of the estate
over any homestead interest does not exceed $2,500, it may be set aside
to the surviving spouse. (Prob. Code, §§ 640-646.)
'In her proposed second amended complaint on motion for a new trial
the :filing of which the court authorized in its order granting the motion
the matters are directcy alleged.

92
that notice had been
in
Section 1200 of the Probate Code
defendant well knew that notice had not been
tiff
to her
as hereinabove
defendant further
and with intent to deceive
the said Court
that the value of said estate did
not exceed
at the time of decedent's death; that defendant . . . the widow of said
did not possess other
estate in excess of
in
; and that the entire estate,
including the real
... consisted of community property; that at the time of
said fraudulent representations, defendant well knew that said real property was not
community property but the separate property of the decedent, and defendant .Anna Simmonds possessed property having a value in excess of $7,500." That: ".As a result of the
facts, fraud and fraudulent concealments hereinabove alleged,
plaintiff was not made aware of the pendency of the hearing
of the said decree assigning the estate to defendant .Anna
Simmonds, and therefore did not appear in said Court so as
to present the true facts in this matter." That plaintiff "did
not know or discover" or "suspect" such a proceeding until
July 7, 1952. Plaintiff prays that the "decree of distribution'' be set aside, for partition of the property and other
relief. Plainly the main purpose of the action was to obtain
equitable relief from the probate decree assigning all of
Thomas' estate to defendant, his widow.
Defendants assert that the complaint is insufficient because
plaintiff's attack is collateral and extrinsic fraud must be
pleaded ;5 that plaintiff's allegations that no notice was given
were on information and belief when they should have been
direct; that it does not appear that the request for notice was
filed prior to the application to set the estate aside to defendant
widow; that there is no allegation that special notice under
sections 1200 and 1202 of the Probate Code was not given or
that the court in the proceeding failed to make a finding as to
the giving of special notice; that there is no allegation that
the appraisal of the estate was incorrect; that no showing of a
different result would have followed (refusal to set aside the
estate except for the fraud) ; that plaintiff was guilty of
"''In the absence of fraud in the procurement an order of the superior
court assigning an estate pursuant to the provisions of the preceding
section, when it becomes final, is a conclusive determination of the
jurisdiction of the court (except when based on the erroneous assumption
of death), and cannot be collaterally attacked." (Prob. Code, 9 645.1.)

93
to
1952, before
knew of the probate
the

not entirely clear, we
defendants' claims as
and
construed
v. Hibernia Bank,
it states a cause of action.
from the complaint and facts
it is
either
or by inference that plaintiff had no knowledge of the application for setting aside the
estate and was not given notice thereof although she knew
the probate proceedings were pending; that her request for
special notice was given before the hearing on the application
to set aside the estate to defendant widow; that McMinn was
fraudulent in representing to the court he had given special
notice and in his failure to give notice for the purpose of enhancing the amount that would be received from the estate by
defendant widow and to carry out that fraud misrepresented
the value of the estate to the court; that as a result plaintiff did
not contest the proceedings and, as the estate exceeded $2,500,
the result would have been different, that is, it would not have
been set aside. While the paragraph from the amended complaint heretofore quoted commences with an allegation based
on information and belief it does not necessarily follow that
the whole paragraph is so based; it may be reasonably interpreted to apply only to the first clause, leaving the balance as
direct allegations on knowledge. It appears therefore that a
reasonable construction would point to a fraudulent exclusion
of plaintiff from the hearing on the application to set aside
the estate. In Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322 [65 P.2d 777,
113 A.L.R. 1230), the court was considering a case where for
fraudulent reasons no notice was given in a probate proceeding to a granddaughter of decedent who was not mentioned in the will. The court held there was extrinsic fraud,
stating (p. 324): "Respondent's case rests upon extrinsic
fraud alleged to have been committed by Schaffer in conducting the probate proceedings in the estate of Adeline Potter
without disclosing her relationship to the deceased and notifying the respondent of the proceedings. The complaint alleged
that at the time Schaffer filed his petition for probate of
the Potter will, he knew that respondent was the granddaughter of :Mrs. Potter; that she was residing in Los Angeles,
U<O'"WCHM
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California; and that his failure to disclose her existence was
for the purpose of defrauding respondent out of her share of
the estate. . . .
" . . . The case, therefore, presents a situation where according to the findings of the trial court an executor, who
was practically the sole beneficiary of the estate, kept an
heir in ignorance of the death of her ancestor 'with fraudulent design and intent to gain for himself a share of said
estate which rightfully and lawfully belonged to' such heir ....
[9] "It is well settled that equity may afford relief from
orders and decrees in probate proceedings for extrinsic fraud.
(Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 475 [23 P.2d 758, 88 A.L.R.
1194].) But appellant insists that any fraud practiced by
Schaffer was intrinsic. The theory of this contention is, principally, that fraud to be extrinsic must be practiced directly
upon the plaintiff in such an action ....
[10] "In the early case of Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 326
[67 P. 282, 87 Am.St.Rep. 98], extrinsic fraud was said to
consist 'in the failure to give legal notice to the adversary,
the prevention of him or his witnesses from attending the
trial, and the like.' In Caldwell v. Taylor, supra, where the
entire subject was exhaustively considered, the court said:
'The main requirement to establish extrinsic fraud is that the
unsuccessful party was prevented by his adversary from presenting all of his case to the court. One of the examples
given is that of a party who is prevented from appearing in
court.' . . .
"However, it is difficult to see how fraud could be practiced more directly upon one entitled to present his rights
to a court than by keeping him in ignorance of the proceedings. It is true that in most cases of extrinsic fraud the
defendant has said something directly to the person whose
rights were involved amounting to representations that it was
not necessary for such person to take any part in the proceedings. In other cases, acts have been held to amount to
such representations. But the rule allowing the maintenance
of an action in equity for extrinsic fraud should not be limited
so strictly as to require as a basis evidence of representations
made directly to the one defrauded.
"In this case notice of the hearing of Schaffer's petitions
was required to be served upon the heirs of the testator either
personally or by mail. ... Schaffer as the proponent of the will
in the first instance and as the duly qualified and appointed
executor thereof after it was admitted to probate, was charged
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with the utmost good faith to the heirs of the deceased and
to the court. It was his duty to see that notice of the proceedings was given to those whom he knew to be heirs of Mrs.
Potter. The same situation was considered in the case of
Zaremba v. Woods, 17 Cal.App.2d 309 [61 P.2d 976]. There
the executor of a will also presented a petition stating that
the deceased left no heirs. It was claimed, as it is here, that his
representation amounted to intrinsic but not extrinsic fraud.
But the court held that the allegation constituted extrinsic
fraud, saying: 'There is a clear line of demarcation, however,
between a statement made in the petition for the probate of
the will which would limit the giving of notices to heirs, and
testimony in court to the effect that there were no such
heirs, after the heirs had been notified of the proceeding for
the probate of the will, as provided by the different sections
of the Probate Code.'
"Whatever may have been the motive of Schaffer, whether
it was induced by the agreement which the court found he
made with Mrs. Potter's son, or by some other reason, his acts
in suppressing all information concerning respondent and
representing Thomas Purinton to be the only son of the deceased, amounts to fraud practiced directly against the respondent. They furnish abundant foundation for a judgment
holding him to have been a trustee for the property which
should have been distributed to the respondent but which he
wrongfully received." (See Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d
227 [293 P.2d 778]; Craney v. Low, 46 Cal.2d 757 [298 P.2d
860]; Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, supra, 47 Cal.2d 540; Van
Strien v. Jones, 46 Cal.2d 705, 706 [229 P.2d 1].) It should
be observed that plaintiff's equitable attack on the order setting aside the estate is a direct rather than a collateral one.
(Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, supra, 47 Cal.2d 540, 558.)
And, "Such an attack may be made upon the ground of
extrinsic fraud where it appears that there was a willful
fm7ure to give the required service or that willfully false affidavits of service were filed .... A direct attack has also been
allowed in an independent action in equity where there has
been a failure to exercise the degree of diligence required
by law in connection with personal service [citations], where
false recitals of service were the result of fraud, negligence,
or mistake [citation], and where failure to name a person
as a party was the result of mistake [citation]. These cases
are in accord with the general principles followed in recent
decisions of this court holding that extrinsic mistake may

A.L.R.
P.2d 3].)
within these
of his death
Also, as we have
Hibernia either
or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have discovered that
was Curtin's successor." (Emphasis added Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, supra,
47 Cal.2d 540.)
[7b] 'fhe other matters urged by defendants involve problems of clarification of the amended complaint and might have
been raised on special demurrer but here we have a judgment
on the pleadings which is the same as a judgment after sustaining a general demurrer. (Beverage v. Canton Placer
Mining Co., sttpra, 43 Cal.2d 769; Dragna v. White, supra,
45 Cal.2d 469.)
[11] There is some question as to the prayer of the complaint and its title which indicate a partition proceeding
but the prayer does not destroy an otherwise sufficiently stated
cause of action. (See Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal.2d 489 [289
P.2d 794]; Babbitt v. Babbitt, 44 Cal.2d 289 [282 P.2d 1].)
Moreover, it would appear plaintiff should have been permitted to amend her complaint. After argument on defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings the following
transpired :
''THE CouRT: Well, Counsel, I think if you are able to prove
the allegations alleged in the Complaint, you have a cause of
action, but I don't think this is it.
"The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.
"MR. TOBIN [defendants' counsel]: Thank you, Your
Honor.
"MR. CLIFFORD [plaintiff's counsel] : Is that with leave
to amend, Your Honor Y
''THE CouRT : I don't see how you can amend.
"MR. CLIFFORD: I think we can, Your Honor.
''THE CouRT : How do you propose to amend 1
"MR. CLIFFORD: I propose to amend, Your Honor, by showing that if Your Honor was apparently impressed by the
other case, that another result would be achieved had the
decree not been made in San Francisco, and I can show, Your
Honor, that-as a matter of fact, the other case was com-
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demonstrative of the
that we have in this case
that a cause of action has been stated; that this was extrinsic
fraud.
"THE CouRT: I think you may have another cause of action
"MR. ToBIN: I'd like to say, Your Honor, in that connection' 'MR. CLIFFORD: The motion is
without leave
amendf
"THE CouRT : Right.
''MR. ToBIN : Thank you."
[12] While a more clearcut request for amendment could
have been made, assuming one was necessary, we think it was
sufficient and clearly there is a reasonable possibility (Lemoge
Electric v. County of San Mateo, 46 Cal.2d 659 [297 P.2d
638]) that matters going to the claimed failure to state a
cause of action could have been cured by amendment. The
statement in Beverage v. Canton Placer Mining Co., 43 Cal.2d
769,778 [278 P.2d 694], is pertinent: "The facts stated in the
pleadings indicate that plaintiffs may have a good cause of
action but that it has been defectively or imperfectly pleaded.
Defendants did not call attention to these claimed defects
either by demurrer or by duly noticed motion for judgment
on the pleadings, although they had long known the condition
of the pleadings preceding the trial. Under such conditions
the trial court should not have granted the surprise motion,
which attacked the pleadings for the first time at the time of
trial, without first giving plaintiffs an opportunity to elect
whether they would stand on their pleadings or amend them.
[Citation.] Defendants' failure to give plaintiffs notice of
their intention to attack the pleadings prior to the trial also
excuses the failure of plaintiffs to go to the trial armed with
formal amendments to offer to the court in the event that the
pleadings are unexpectedly attacked. (Macisaac v. Pozzo,
supra [26 Cal.2d 809 (161 P.2d 449)].) ... [13] In addition there is some justification for the failure of plaintiffs to
formally move to amend. D~fendants constantly took the
position that the pleadings could not be amended to state a
cause of action. The trial court adopted defendants' view and
repeatedly stated that the complaint could not be so amended.
Faced with this attitude plaintiffs apparently were convinced,
and were justified in assuming, that a formal offer to amend
would have been futile." Furthermore, the policy of section
oW C.Jd.-4
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472c of the Code of Civil Procedure6 should, by analogy, be
applied.
The order vacating the judgment and granting a new trial
is affirmed. Since this leaves no judgment standing in the
case, the appeal therefrom is dismissed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk,
Comb, J ., concurred.

Traynor, J., Spence, J., and Me-

SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
judgment, and am in general accord with the opinion of Mr.
Justice Carter except insofar as it holds that plaintiff's first
amended complaint in its present form states a cause of action
for extrinsic fraud. In my view, even the most liberal construction of the allegations relating to fraud which appear in
plaintiff's first amended complaint does not render those allegations sufficient to state a cause of action based on extrinsic
fraud.
The first amended complaint alleges, in material part, as
follows: ''Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore
alleges that said Berdella Marie McMinn on or about the 15th
day of October, 1951, fraudulently procured a decree purportedly assigning the whole estate of Thomas J. Simmonds
deceased, to the surviving widow, the defendant Anna Simmonds; that in order to obtain said decree said defendant
Berdella Marie McMinn fraudulently and with intent to
deceive said Court and to obtain a greater interest in the
real property hereinabove described, represented to the Court
that notice had been given in all respects as required by Section 1200 of the Probate Code during which time said defendant well knew that notice had not been given to plaintiff
pursuant to her request as hereinabove alleged. Said defendant further fraudulently and with intent to deceive the said
Court represented that the value of said estate did not exceed
$2,500 at the time of decedent's death; that defendant Anna
Simmonds, the widow of said decedent, did not possess other
estate in excess of $5,000 in value; and that the entire estate,
including the real property hereinabove described, consisted of
community property; that at the time of making said fraudu•"When any court makes an order sustaining a demurrer without
leave to amend the question as to whether or not such court abused its
discretion in making such an order is open on appeal even though no
request to amend such pleading was made; provided, however, that this
section shall not apply to any pending action or proceeding." (Code

Civ. Proc., t 472e.)
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lent representations, defendant well knew that said real property was not community property but the separate property
of the decedent, and defendant Anna Simmonds possessed
property having a value in excess of $7,500."
The extrinsic fraud complained of is the alleged failure
of the administratrix McMinn to notify plaintiff of the pending proceeding to set aside the entire estate of the deceden1
to his surviving widow. Any fraud in the representations of
the administratrix as to the value and character of the property involved is intrinsic, and does not affect the alleged denial
to plaintiff of her day in court. (See Stiebel v. Roberts
(1941), 42 Cal.App.2d 434,438-439 [3] [109 P.2d 22].) Thus
only the first sentence of the above quoted allegation is
pertinent to the inquiry of whether the complaint states a
cause of action grounded on extrinsic fraud.
The first segment of the allegation under consideration
states on information and belief the general proposition that
the decree assigning the entire estate to the surviving widow
was fraudulently procured. The remaining clauses of that
sentence purport to state the manner in which such fraud was
practiced, viz., by a representation by defendant McMinn to
the court that the required statutory notice had been given,
at a time when McMinn knew that such notice had in fact
not been given. If plaintiff knew positively the facts which
constituted the alleged fraud, then there would be no need
to allege on information and belief that such fraud had been
committed; conversely, if plaintiff alleges on information and
belief that fraud has been perpetrated, then it must follow
that succeeding allegations as to the basis of the fraud are
also made on information and belief. While it is true that the
mere fact that a paragraph of a complaint commences with
an allegation on information and belief does not necessarily
require the conclusion that the entire paragraph is so based, in
the sentence here under consideration an interpretation that
the information and belief basis applies only to the first clause
of the sentence and not to the succeeding amplifying clauses
is neither reasonable nor proper. Certainly if the pleader were
on trial for perjury in her averments-and the manifest objective of requiring verified pleadings is the truthful definition
of the real issues of fact on pain of perjury-all of the quoted
allegations would be construed to be only on information and
belief.
It is not questioned that the acts attributed to the administratrix on the information and belief basis, if proven, would
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constitute extrinsic fraud which could properly form the
basis for granting relief to
But the complaint in its
present form fails to
the issue of extrinsic fraud to the
trier of fact. " [I] t
not sufficient to allege fraud or its
elements upon information and belief, unless the facts upon
which the belief is founded are stated in the pleading.''
(Dowling v.
Water Oo.
), 174 CaL 218,
221 [162 P. 894]; Findley v. Garrett (1952), 109 Cal.App.
2d 166, 176-177 [3] [240 P.2d 421].) No facts are stated
in the present complaint on which a belief might properly be
based that the administratrix knew that the required notice
had not been given at the time when she represented that it
had been given. \Vhile it is true that ''there must be cases
in which the knowledge of the fraud by its perpetrator must
be charged on information and belief, ... [still] in such cases
there mttst be allegations of facts which show positively or by
reasonable inference that such knowledge must have been
possessed by the person accused of the fraud." (Dowling v.
Spring Valley Water Oo. (1917), supra, 174 Cal. 218, 221;
italics added.) The allegations relative to extrinsic fraud in
their present form without more cannot be considered sufficient allegations of the charges made. (Mason v. San-llal
Oil & Water Oo., Ltd. (1934), 1 Cal.2d 670, 672 [2] [36 P.2d
616].)
From the foregoing discussion it seems clear that the trial
court was justified in holding that the complaint here did not
state a cause of action. However, since, conceivably, plaintiff
could have alleged facts constituting a basis of information
and belief on which the conclusional fact of fraud could rest,
or could have stated the allegations of fraud in positive terms, 1
leave to amend the complaint should have been granted.
The petition of defendants and appellants for a rehearing
was denied October 17, 1957.

'In the order of the trial court granting the motion for new trial,
plaintiff was also granted permission to file an amended complaint. In
this amended complaint the allegations as to fraud are st~ted positively.

